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MID-ATLANTIC  ETHICS  COMMITTEE
N E W S L E T T E R
ETHICS OF CARING FOR TRANSGENDER 
PERSONS
Clinicians and ethics consultants may encounter questions regarding the treatment 
of transgender persons in many medical contexts. Providers may feel less confident 
when trying to help transgender persons because they do not know enough about their 
foremost needs and wants.
In this piece I discuss some key considerations for providers to best help these 
persons. This includes understanding the right words to use, common critical needs, 
and the importance of advocacy.
Overriding concerns for most transgender persons are two basic desires: the ability 
to live authentically and to have others respond to them on the basis of who they are 
as opposed to how they may look.1 These concerns underlie many of the guidelines I 
outline below.
I. Using the Right Words 
 Providers should use 
the most respectful words 
to describe transgender 
persons—the words requested 
by transgender individuals 
themselves. It is particularly important that providers of transgender persons see them 
as the gender they are, i.e., the gender that they identify with. 
Finding the right words here may be difficult: “Trans is a very new term … [It] is 
meant to be a new umbrella term to represent all atypical genders. … Cis is a word 
used to describe the opposite of trans.”2
First, providers should not refer to transgender persons as “patients.” I have thus far 
intentionally used the word “person” instead of “patient.” This is because changing 
or wanting to change one’s gender is not a disorder. Trans people may have disorders. 
Being trans, however, is not a disorder. There is a distinction between transgender 
identity and dysphoria. Gender dysphoria is discomfort or distress caused by a 
discrepancy between an individual’s gender identity and the gender assigned at birth. 
Some trans people have gender dysphoria but not all. It is a mistake then for providers 
to refer to these people as “patients” since they may not have a disorder. Further, to 
refer to them as patients when they may not have a disorder is implicitly stigmatizing. 
Some individuals may have symptoms, such as depression, that meet the criteria for 
a disorder. If this occurs, they should of course be diagnosed and treated. Depression 
or anxiety, however, may be caused by living in a body that does not reflect their 
vision of themselves. Thus, their feelings of depression may change after they change 
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their bodily characteristics.
I recall one late adolescent male who 
had, according to both his parents and 
himself, felt depressed his entire life 
since early childhood. Once he had 
surgery to remove his breast tissue, 
however, he reported feeling happy for 
the first time, virtually overnight.
Providers should also use the right 
pronouns. Providers should not 
choose pronouns for a person, but 
should simply ask the person, “What 
pronouns would you like me to use 
for you?” Transgender persons want 
their providers to know their gender 
and how they want to be addressed. 
Providers should use the pronouns 
people request, even if the provider 
is unfamiliar with that pronoun. In 
addition, it is important for providers 
to call these individuals by the correct 
first name, regardless of whether that 
name is reflected on legal documents. 
Some providers believe that these 
persons should have to take the 
initiative to tell the provider if they 
would like their providers to call 
them a name that corresponds with 
their gender. This view, however, 
is not ethically optimal because it 
discriminates against transgender 
persons less willing to take this 
initiative. Thus, it may be better for 
providers not knowing how to refer to 
these individuals to take the initiative 
and ask them.
II. Respecting Transgender Persons’ 
Individual Needs
Attempting to use the right words 
is just one of many ways that 
providers should attend to transgender 
persons’ individual needs. Another 
consideration is the much publicized 
concern regarding bathroom use. 
I recall meeting years ago with a 
LGBT group of professionals. One of 
its transgender members suggested 
that, when feasible, there should be 
three bathrooms instead of two, one 
for men, one for women and one for 
people of all genders. Some places 
are now creating these all-genders 
restrooms. This is optimal as it 
demonstrates the most respect for 
trans identities, especially trans people 
who are non-binary (i.e., they do not 
identify as either men or women). 
This third bathroom may, though, 
be suboptimal if some transgender 
persons are fearful of revealing their 
transgender identity by entering the 
bathroom.
Some may assert that this concern is 
not problematic because transgender 
persons should be as proud of who 
they are as anyone else. While true, 
this assertion fails to take into account 
important subjective differences, 
as well as the increased likelihood 
of harassment and violence against 
transgender people. For bathrooms, 
as for all considerations, providers 
should take into account the full range 
of individual experiences. Some 
transgender persons may not feel 
sufficiently confident in their status 
to let others know about it or may be 
unwilling to face the increased risk of 
harm. Providers should thus adjust to 
what these persons individually need 
rather than over-generalize based on 
all transgender persons.
Transgender persons’ sexual 
orientation—which indicates the 
partners to whom they feel sexually 
attracted—likewise, lies along a 
spectrum. Regardless of gender 
identity, persons may be attracted to 
others of the same or the opposite 
gender or both, and this may change 
over time. The sexual feelings a 
person experiences may also change if 
they take hormones. Some trans men 
may experience increased aggression 
or agitation due to testosterone and 
the libido of some trans women 
taking estrogen may decrease.3 If 
trans women have bottom surgery, 
afterward they may have to continue 
to dilate their vaginas. Providers can 
benefit transgender persons by sharing 
this knowledge with the transgender 
persons in their care. All too often, 
transgender persons report knowing 
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more about their medical realities than 
the providers. Justifiably, transgender 
persons want their providers to inform 
them rather than the reverse.
III. Advocating for Transgender 
Persons
Gender identity may differ 
profoundly from one person to the 
next and may cause differences in 
transgender persons’ bodily goals. 
These differences are best understood 
as lying along a spectrum. Thus, some 
persons may not want any bodily 
changes or may want only some of the 
bodily interventions available. Some 
may want to stop after only having 
taken hormones or after top, but not 
bottom, surgery. Some may want all 
possible bodily changes. Providers 
should understand and respect this.
Further, some may differ in what 
they want providers to know. Some 
transgender individuals may not want 
to disclose their transgender identity to 
their providers if their medical needs 
do not require it. Physicians may be 
most accustomed to expecting that 
patients will be open to disclosing 
most private aspects of themselves. 
For transgender persons, however, this 
is not necessarily the case.
In addition to having the freedom 
to be wholly themselves, transgender 
persons also may need and want to 
appear in a way that helps others 
respond to their identities, not their 
given physiology. Thus, some may 
benefit from different kinds of medical 
interventions that help change their 
appearance. For example, some trans 
women change their voice if they 
feel it is too deep and eliminate facial 
beard growth. 
Transgender persons may need 
providers to act as their advocates in 
the pursuit of bodily interventions. 
This may be especially true where 
insurers require that prior to covering 
transgender procedures (e.g., hormone 
therapy or surgery) the treating 
physician refer the trans person 
to a therapist for evaluation and a 
recommendation and when providers 
who are not mental health specialists, 
such as endocrinologists, want 
psychological consultation prior to 
prescribing medications. While this 
in itself may be ethically questionable 
in that it is highly paternalistic, it 
may also raise ethical conflicts for the 
therapist and the trans person. This 
is the case when, for example, an 
endocrinologist asks for a psychiatric 
or psychological consult and a mental 
health provider has already been 
seeing the trans person for therapy to 
support gender confirmation surgery 
or other related interventions. If the 
trans person knows that the provider 
they are seeing for therapy may have 
to make a recommendation regarding 
an intervention in the future, the trans 
person may be faced with having to 
choose between sharing their genuine 
feelings during therapy and taking 
the risk that this will not maximize 
the likelihood that the therapist will 
recommend what the trans person 
wants and sharing what they believe 
will maximize the likelihood that the 
therapist will approve the intervention. 
The therapist may be in the position 
of either supporting his/her client by 
advocating what his or her client most 
wants or being an objective evaluator 
of what the therapist believes is best 
for the client. If the therapist takes 
this latter approach, he or she is acting 
on his or her own view as opposed to 
respecting the autonomy of the trans 
person. This may harm the patient/
therapist relationship. Accordingly, 
transgender persons and their 
therapists should discuss potential 
conflicts. 
These evaluations may be 
unwarranted. They may also 
discriminate against trans persons in 
that other persons seeking treatments 
in comparable contexts are not 
required to undergo such evaluations. 
Therapists should then ask this 
question: By offering an opinion, are 
they morally complicit in this implicit 
discrimination, and if not, why not? 
If an evaluation is necessary for the 
trans person to receive the intervention 
he or she wants, the therapist then 
could refer the evaluation to others 
and/or advocate for the trans person 
by telling the insurance company that 
such evaluations are discriminatory. 
Alternatively, transgender persons 
and their therapists may agree on 
objective criteria to decide whether to 
recommend surgery. They may agree 
in advance, for instance, on a length 
of time that the transgender person 
should live openly in the gender 
they seek as a trial to help determine 
whether this person still wants, 
and thus should have, the desired 
intervention.
In other instances, providers may 
also need to specifically advocate for 
transgender persons. For example, 
trans men may want contouring 
surgery to achieve visual traits 
consistent with being male, which 
can help avoid unwanted attention.4 
Likewise, trans women may want 
breast augmentation in addition to 
estrogen.5 Providers should support 
these interventions. Providers, 
more than others, should know 
how exceptionally important these 
additional interventions may be to 
transgender persons.
Adults rarely change their minds 
after making bodily changes to 
affirm their identities but children 
may be different. The most difficult 
decision for providers may be when 
and whether to advocate for early 
adolescents or even children who want 
hormones or surgery to bring about 
the body changes they want. Children 
may want medications to prevent 
or delay puberty that causes certain 
changes. Children and adolescents 
who want to change their bodies may 
more commonly change their minds. 
For example, recognized experts 
Drescher and Pula report that, “as 
the World Professional Association 
for Transgender Health . . . notes in 
its latest Standards of Care, gender 
dysphoria in childhood does not 
inevitably continue into adulthood.”6 
Only 6 to 23 percent of boys and 12 
to 27 percent of girls treated in gender 
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clinics showed a persistence of their 
gender dysphoria into adulthood. 
Gender dysphoria is different from 
gender identity, however, so it is 
unclear what clinical significance, if 
any, this statistic should have. 
The best approach may be to give 
these younger persons more time to 
be able to better determine who they 
are and what they think is best for 
them. This may be especially true 
because there is still limited research 
on this question.7 Puberty-suppression 
regimes can provide this extra time to 
children and adolescents. Providers 
should be more cautious when 
treating these individuals when the 
interventions they want are more 
irreversible.
A frequently used guideline for 
determining when to initiate gender-
affirming treatments is the length of 
time transgender persons have lived 
openly as their gender identity. The 
strictness with which this criterion 
should be applied, however, may vary 
depending on several circumstances 
such as the age of the person wanting 
the intervention and the degree 
to which this intervention can or 
can’t be reversed. Here, however, 
providers should also be aware that 
in many contexts, it may be difficult 
or impossible for transgender persons 
to spend time living as the gender 
they are. Thus, this criterion may best 
remain open to allowing exceptions.
Finally, transgender persons may 
want to have and raise children. 
They may want medical help to do 
this. Here again providers may find 
that they can serve an important role 
as advocates. Unfortunately, trans 
persons may encounter exceptional 
difficulties when seeking to have 
children because of lingering false 
beliefs that LGBT persons may be 
less effective as parents. Providers 
should know that this is not the 
case and they should be willing to 
advocate accordingly for transgender 
persons who seek to be parents.8 
Fortunately, this and similar false 
and discriminatory beliefs are now 
changing. For example, one court has 
recently held that a non- biological, 
non-adoptive partner should have 
legal standing for both visiting and 
custody privileges. The court said 
that discriminatory views regarding 
same sex partners are currently 
“unsustainable.”9
Providers seeking an excellent 
and regularly updated source of 
optimal standards of care may find 
guidance from the World Professional 
Association for Transgender Health 
website (WPATH).10 The most recent 
guidance, Number 7, was issued in 
2011 and is used worldwide.
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value-laden task of 
selecting recipients. 
They notoriously 
considered social 
worth criteria and 
favored individuals 
like themselves. The 
Seattle committee 
stands in contrast to 
today’s transplant 
review committees 
and ethics 
committees, which 
are held accountable to more objective 
and transparent criteria when faced 
with decisions about allocating scarce 
resources. 
Dilemmas associated with allocating 
kidney dialysis were averted after 
more dialysis centers emerged and 
a patient advocacy campaign led 
Congress to pass the End Stage 
Renal Disease (ESRD) Act in 1972, 
which provides reimbursement for 
kidney dialysis through a Medicare 
supplement. While individuals 
with kidney failure have an option 
in dialysis, 18 people waiting for 
a life-saving organ transplant die 
every day. In the 1980s, news of 
organs being bought and sold raised 
concerns about exploitation. Congress 
responded by passing the National 
Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) 
in 1984, which made it illegal to 
compensate organ donors. NOTA 
was amended in 1988 to establish 
Organ Procurement Organizations 
(OPOs) through a contract with the 
United Network for Organ Sharing 
(UNOS), which currently oversees 
58 OPOs in the U.S. and territories 
in 11 regions. NOTA’s Final Rule, 
implemented in 2000, called for 
reducing the criteria for organ wait 
list candidates, prioritizing medical 
urgency, and identifying standardized 
objective medical criteria to assess 
medical urgency of those on an organ 
transplant wait list. 
Another milestone 
in transplant medicine 
was the passing of the 
Uniform Anatomical 
Gift Act (UAGA) in 
1968, which regulates 
the donation of organs, 
tissues, and other 
human body parts in 
the U.S. Notably, to 
facilitate adherence 
to the “Dead Donor 
Rule” (that a person must be dead 
before life-preserving organs can be 
procured), the UAGA established 
death of a person as occurring when 
there is irreversible cessation of 
either: (1) circulatory and respiratory 
functions, or (2) all functions of the 
entire brain, including the brain stem. 
This established two protocols for 
procuring cadaver organs: (1) after 
neurologic death (“brain death”) or (2) 
after cardiac death. 
Living Legacy Foundation (LLF), 
Maryland’s OPO, in collaboration 
with staff from the University of 
Maryland Medical Center (UMMC), 
presented two simulations at the 
November 1 conference depicting 
best practices for approaching family 
members about organ donation after 
neurologic death. The first simulation 
involved the mother of a teenager 
who had been shot (played by Laurel 
Gaffney, MS, LLF’s Manager of 
Hospital Services), the physician in 
charge of the boy’s care (played by 
Nirav Shah, MD, Program Director 
for the Pulmonary and Critical Care 
Fellowship program at UMMC), a 
nurse transplant coordinator (Tyree 
Nutter, RN, MA, UMMC’s Organ 
and Tissue Donor Program’s in-house 
coordinator), an OPO family services 
coordinator (Heba Youssef, LLF’s 
Family Services Coordinator), and a 
ORGAN DONATION & TRANSPLANTATION: ETHICS, 
RELIGION, & INTERPROFESSIONAL COLLABORATION 
On November 1, 2016, MHECN, in 
collaboration with the University of 
Maryland, Baltimore (UMB) Schools 
of Law, Medicine, Nursing, Pharmacy, 
and Social Work, the UMB Graduate 
School, and the Institute for Jewish 
Continuity, co-sponsored the Third 
Annual Interprofessional Forum on 
Ethics and Religion in Health Care: 
Challenges in Organ Donation and 
Transplantation. 
Silke Niederhaus, MD, clinical 
assistant professor of surgery at 
the University of Maryland School 
of Medicine, provided a unique 
perspective on being both a transplant 
surgeon and an organ recipient (she 
received a kidney transplant in 1988). 
She recounted a school assignment 
after her kidney transplant to 
“Describe what your life would be like 
as a 12-13 year old if you had been 
born one century ago.” She turned in 
the following minimalist (and self-
proclaimed “cheeky”) essay: “I would 
have been dead.” Indeed, lives saved 
by transplant medicine burgeoned 
after advances in post-transplant 
immunosuppressants reduced organ 
rejection rates and improved transplant 
outcomes. Still, demand for organs 
outstrips supply, raising ethical 
questions about methods for increasing 
supply and fairly allocating available 
organs. 
A precursor to transplant ethics 
occurred when Scribner and 
colleagues invented the “Scribner 
shunt” in 1960, which allowed 
people otherwise dying from kidney 
failure to receive outpatient kidney 
dialysis. Given the limited supply of 
dialysis machines, a lay committee 
was assembled in Seattle in 1961 to 
decide who should get access to the 
twice-weekly dialysis. The seven 
committee members (dubbed the 
“God Committee” in a landmark Life 
Magazine article) grappled with the 
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hospital chaplain (Rabbi Ruth Smith, 
UMMC’s Lead Chaplain for organ 
transplant). The goal for this encounter 
was to explain to the mom that her son 
had died, based on tests confirming 
irreversible loss of brain function 
(e.g., unreceptivity/unresponsivity 
in absence of hypothermia or central 
nervous system depressants, no 
movement or reflexes, no breathing 
after ventilator removal for 10 
minutes, a flat EEG, and lack of blood 
flow to the brain). Communicating 
this news with compassion, addressing 
the mom’s strong emotions, and 
minimizing medical jargon, were key. 
The second simulation involved the 
same individuals with Youssef taking 
the lead in explaining the option of 
organ donation to the mom. Separating 
these discussions is one way in which 
clinicians protect against role conflicts 
resulting from dual obligations to 
care for a dying patient and to support 
the organ donation process for the 
benefit of organ transplant recipients. 
One challenge that OPO staff deal 
with is explaining the process of 
organ procurement to grieving family 
members. The bodies of patients 
confirmed to be dead by neurologic 
criteria are “treated” with mechanical 
ventilation, drugs, and (if allowed 
by family) even cardiac resuscitation 
attempts (if the heart stops beating 
before the surgical team is ready to 
procure the organs) to preserve organs 
for donation. In donation after cardiac 
death, loved ones have a matter of 
minutes to “say goodbye” after the 
patient is pronounced dead before 
the surgical team initiates organ 
procurement surgery. OPO staff do all 
they can to minimize loved one’s grief 
and distress by explaining procedures 
and their purpose in advance and 
respecting patients’ and families’ 
spiritual and religious beliefs and 
practices. 
Another challenge faced by OPO 
staff is complying with a revision 
to the UAGA implemented in 2006, 
which directs OPOs to notify family 
of a designated donor rather than 
obtain surrogate consent for organ 
procurement after brain death is 
confirmed (called “first person 
authorization”). Some OPOs have 
gone to court to compel organ 
procurement for a designated donor 
if a family objects to organ donation. 
In states like Ohio, where OPOs have 
taken such a strong stance, there has 
been some backlash against organ and 
tissue donor registration; critics argue 
that current organ donor registration 
practices (e.g., at motor vehicle 
administrations) do not provide valid 
informed consent (Iltis, 2015). Thus, 
OPOs and other organizations that 
promote organ and tissue donation are 
looking for ways to educate the public 
and encourage designated donors to 
talk with their loved ones about their 
preferences. 
Anita Tarzian, PhD, RN, MHECN’s 
Program Coordinator and member of 
LLF’s ethics committee and Clinical 
Advisory Board, touched on some 
of the many ethical conflicts arising 
in transplant medicine (see Focus 
on Organ Procurement Strategies 
on page 7). She told the story of 
Marylander Daniel Canal, who in 
1992, at age 13, ended his five-year 
wait on a transplant list after raising 
national media attention about his long 
wait in Pennsylvania for a liver and 
intestines transplant. The combination 
of media attention and shorter organ 
wait list times in Florida led to Daniel 
finally getting the transplant surgery 
he needed. Daniel subsequently had 
three surgeries to transplant a liver, 
intestines, pancreas, and stomach from 
three donors. His body rejected the 
intestines from the first donor. The 
emergent nature of the second surgery 
resulted in a less-than-ideal match and 
subsequent liver transplant failure. The 
final set of organs from a deceased 
child in Puerto Rico have worked 
to this day. Daniel’s case embodies 
many of the ethical issues transplant 
medicine presents, including:
• Is it fair to give multiple organs 
to one person?
• Is it fair to re-transplant someone 
with organs that could go to those 
on the wait list awaiting an initial 
transplant?
• Is preserving geographic priority 
of cadaver organs the fairest way 
to allocate them?
• What is the proper role of media 
appeals for those on an organ 
transplant list?
• What constitutes informed 
consent (and assent) for organ 
transplant? 
• What obligations do we owe to 
donor families?
• What obligations do we owe to 
patients after transplant?
Rabbi Shmuel Silber addressed the 
role of religious beliefs in decision-
making related to organ donation and 
transplantation. Most religions place 
high value on saving lives and thus are 
generally supportive of organ donors 
and recipients. Regarding living 
organ donation, risks include physical 
harm to oneself, lost wages, time 
away from family, or disappointment 
if a recipient’s transplant outcomes 
are not what was hoped. These 
risks must be weighed against the 
benefits of altruistic feelings of 
accomplishment, personal growth, 
increased self-esteem, and for some, 
fulfilling religious duty. However, 
religious persons may also succumb 
to feelings of guilt serving as primary 
motivator. Truly informed consent 
requires understanding the risks and 
benefits, and making a free choice 
that is consistent with one’s life plans, 
beliefs, and values. Such decisions 
require thoughtful reflection/prayer 
and, when appropriate, consultation 
with a trusted member of the clergy. 
One area of misunderstanding is 
Orthodox Jewish interpretations of 
when a patient is considered dead 
such that organs may be procured. 
Many observant Jews define death as 
the moment when cardiopulmonary 
function irreversibly stops, so if 
Cont. on page 8
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FOCUS ON ORGAN 
PROCUREMENT STRATEGIES
Should family be allowed to direct the donation of a loved one’s organs?
In general, directing organs from a dead donor to a social group is not 
allowed. However, a surrogate can direct a loved one’s organs to a named 
person, hospital, or health organization. The opposition to these requests is mostly justice-based. If the organs would 
otherwise be wasted, utilitarians would lean toward allowing this, but would also consider the bad press that could 
result, which could damage the transplant enterprise. Thus, OPO staff encourage non-directed donation before 
pursuing requests for directed donation.
Is it OK to advertise for an organ?
Individuals have mounted media campaigns to solicit either a living organ donation or a directed cadaveric 
donation. While this favors those with financial means and social connections for such campaigns, it may also 
increase public awareness, which could lead to increased organ donor registration. OPO staff and transplant programs 
must remain vigilant to avoid commercializing the process of organ donation and transplantation (Veatch &  
Ross, 2015).
What’s wrong with buying and selling organs?
The National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) prohibits selling organs in the U.S. In other countries, evidence of 
widespread exploitation and human organ trafficking has highlighted the dark side of allowing an open market for 
organ trade. Exploitation of the poor and marginalized individuals in China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh 
have made headlines. So far, Iran is the only country that has legalized and regulates marketed living donor organs. 
Payment is between $4,000 to $8,000. In 2010, 70% of kidneys transplanted in Iran were living unrelated, 5% related, 
and 25% deceased. Proponents claim this induces less familial pressure, especially on women (Veatch & Ross, 2015). 
Conditions in the U.S. make it highly unlikely we will ever adopt a market approach to resolve the issue of shortage 
of organs for transplantation.
Why not switch to an opt-out model for organ procurement after death?
An “opt-out” model for organ procurement after death involves allowing organ procurement to proceed unless 
one has registered beforehand to opt out. Countries closer to a communitarian or socialist culture are more apt to use 
this method. Veatch and Ross (2015) criticize the terminology of “presumed consent” for this model, arguing that 
it’s inaccurate to conclude that individuals who failed to opt out have given valid informed consent. An unintended 
consequence could be that larger numbers than anticipated would opt out, resulting in the number of organs being 
procured dipping below the current rate of about 75%. Deontologists (ethicists focusing on duties regardless of 
outcomes) might argue that those who would want to opt out might be different from others in ways that discriminate 
and thwart their ability to opt out, such as applying for a driver’s license or having access to the opt-out information 
and process steps. Deontologists might also propose that even if an opt-out procedure resulted in a net gain of organs 
for transplantation, it would not be worth it to procure organs from some objectors who failed to opt out. Since most 
cadaveric organs in the U.S. are procured by family consent at the time of death, rather than by people registering as 
designated donors, it’s unlikely that we will take the risks described above by switching to an opt-out system.
REFERENCE
Veatch, R.M. & Ross, L.F. (2015). Transplantation Ethics (2nd Ed.), Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
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a patient is declared dead based 
on neurologic criteria but is on a 
ventilator and his or her heart is 
still beating, an Orthodox Jew may 
consider the person to still be alive. 
Clinicians who don’t appreciate 
the distinction between a medical 
or legal definition of death and a 
religious interpretation may think such 
individuals don’t understand what 
brain death means. Observant Jews 
may fully understand that their loved 
one’s brain function is permanently 
lost and accept the “brain dead” 
diagnosis, but they simply may not 
equate the irreversible loss of brain 
function (a medical judgment) with 
the death of the person (a value 
judgment). How clinicians and policy 
makers should accommodate this 
religious belief deserves thoughtful 
reflection. 
Sterling Brown from the Jordan 
Taylor Brown (JTB) Foundation 
(http://www.jtbrownfoundation.org) 
opened the morning panel session 
describing how the Foundation 
honors the legacy of its namesake, 
Sterling’s younger brother, who 
became an organ donor after his 
untimely death from senseless gun 
violence. Mr. Brown described his 
family’s experience learning that 
Jordan had registered as an organ and 
tissue donor as they were absorbing 
the news of his death. Jordan’s organs 
saved seven others’ lives and restored 
two individuals’ eye sight. The JTB 
Foundation is working to spread a 
message of peace over violence, and 
to encourage individuals to register as 
organ and tissue donors. When asked 
how to approach someone resistant 
to registering as an organ donor for 
fear that clinicians won’t work as 
hard to save his or her life, Mr. Brown 
suggests that such individuals can 
always decline to register and still tell 
their families that they wish to be an 
organ and tissue donor if they are ever 
in a position to donate.  
Laurie Thompson, RN, UMMC’s 
Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) 
Coordinator, described how the PKE 
helps match donors with recipients. If 
a live donor wants to give a kidney to 
a friend or relative but is incompatible 
with the recipient, the program lists 
that individual as a potential donor 
to another recipient. In exchange, the 
donor’s friend or relative is guaranteed 
a kidney from a matching donor on 
the list. It’s critical to ensure that all 
parties are adequately informed and 
that living donors are making a free 
choice.  
The morning conference panel 
culminated with Lindsey Pote, 
PharmD, Program Director of the 
PGY2 Solid Organ Transplantation 
Residency at The Johns Hopkins 
Hospital, giving an overview of the 
role of the transplant pharmacist 
in educating transplant patients 
about their lifelong need for 
immunosuppression and how post-
transplant medication management 
must be tailored to each individual. 
Adherence barriers such as excessive 
medication costs, incompatibility with 
other medications, and managing side 
effects are routinely addressed.
The conference afternoon session 
included a simulated ethics committee 
discussion about a case involving 
a patient declined by a transplant 
program to be listed for a liver 
transplant due to lack of six months 
of alcohol sobriety. The ethics of 
transplant medicine involves balancing 
efficiency (e.g., maximizing benefit 
and minimizing harm) and equity 
(justly allocating scarce resources). 
From an equity perspective, some 
feel alcoholics in general don’t have 
as high a claim to a liver transplant 
because their actions caused their 
liver failure. Yet, equity also demands 
treating like cases alike. Many would 
judge barring alcoholics from liver 
transplants but not others whose self-
injurious behaviors contributed to their 
organ failure as unfair, particularly 
since alcoholism is a chronic disease, 
with alcohol recidivism a symptom 
of that disease. From an efficiency 
perspective, research has shown that 
alcoholics with cirrhosis do well 
after transplant, and that requiring 
six months or more of sobriety prior 
to transplant has not been shown 
to produce better post-transplant 
outcomes (particularly if patients 
have strong social support and lack 
other predictors of poor outcomes) 
(Chodhary et al., 2016). While NOTA 
and UNOS provide guidance to 
transplant programs regarding organ 
wait listing criteria, actual listing 
criteria and the wait list vetting 
process varies among transplant 
programs. Usually, decisions are 
made by the program’s transplant 
review committee, but occasionally, a 
hospital ethics committee is asked to 
weigh in. What makes these decisions 
so difficult is the reality that listing a 
sicker patient for an organ transplant 
will deprive another patient farther 
down the list of that organ. Veatch and 
Ross (2015, p. 354) acknowledge this 
dilemma, but conclude: “We know of 
no sound theoretical basis for arguing 
for any particular formula that would 
establish exactly what the proper ratio 
should be for considering present 
need and over-a-lifetime need.” The 
work of transplant review committees, 
clinicians, and ethics committees in 
weighing these decisions is no small 
task. 
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COMMENTS FROM A SPEECH-
LANGUAGE PATHOLOGIST
   Ambiguity of ethical decision-
making can be reduced by considering 
multiple perspectives and attending to 
facts. Toward this end, I will address 
the following questions:
• What is the physiology of the 
swallowing disorder?
• What are the proposed 
intervention certainties and 
uncertainties?
• Who is the legal health care 
decision maker?
• Who else should be contacted to 
contribute relevant information? 
• What constitutes elder neglect?
• Is a hospice referral appropriate 
at this stage?
• Is it ethically justifiable to ask 
a patient or surrogate to sign 
a waiver to acknowledge risks 
of behaviors not medically 
recommended?   
Physiology & Disease Progression
Brenda has advanced Alzheimer’s 
dementia (AD). Some aspects of the 
disease can be tempered but AD is 
incurable. Inherent in the disease are 
features leading to a gradual loss of 
appetite, influenced by changes in 
taste, loss of cognitive abilities to 
process what food is, and changes 
such as narrowing of the visual field. 
Adaptations may delay the inevitable 
weight loss (such as creating color 
contrast between the plate, the table 
and the food to promote self-feeding 
as an adaption to visual changes). The 
swallow mechanism will be affected 
(dysphagia), initially with food staying 
in the mouth because the person does 
not realize what it is. This results 
in food falling from the front of the 
mouth, staying unswallowed in parts 
of the mouth, such as the cheeks, and 
at times falling back into the throat 
before the person is ready to swallow. 
This may lead to coughing as the food 
enters the airway (aspiration). If the 
cough reflex is depressed and there 
is no reaction, this is called “silent 
aspiration.”
Why do clinicians exhibit alarm 
One of the regular features of this Newsletter is the presentation of a case considered by an ethics committee and an 
analysis of the ethical issues involved. Readers are both encouraged to comment on the case or analysis and to submit 
other cases that their ethics committee has dealt with. In all cases, identifying information about patients and others in the 
case should only be provided with the permission of the patient. Unless otherwise indicated, our policy is not to identify 
the submitter or institution. We may also change facts to protect confidentiality. Cases and comments should be sent to  
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or MHECN, Law & Health Care Program, University of Maryland Francis King Carey 
School of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD 21201.
CASE PRESENTATION
CASE STUDY FROM A TERTIARY CARE HOSPITAL
“Brenda” is a 79 year old former Opera soprano who has been separated from her husband, “Vince,” for the past 10 
years. They never divorced and remain friends. Brenda moved in with her partner, “Janice,” after separating from Vince 
10 years ago. Brenda has no children. Brenda has moderate to severe Alzheimer’s disease, and has been managed thus far 
with support from an extensive network of friends and family, and home health assistants who visit the home 3-5 times 
a week. Until about three months ago, Brenda was attending an adult dementia daycare program and enjoying outings 
such as concerts and visits to the Botanic Gardens. Despite her memory and cognitive deficits, she seemed to enjoy daily 
activities. Over the past three months, her physical condition deteriorated, with a hospital admission two months ago for 
pneumonia. 
Brenda is now admitted to the hospital again for pneumonia, thought to be caused by aspiration. A swallow study 
confirms she is at risk for aspiration. The medical team recommends that she avoid oral intake and that a g-tube be 
placed and tube feedings initiated to avoid repeat aspirations. Hospital staff determine that Brenda lacks capacity to make 
medical decisions. Janice tells the team that Brenda would not want the g-tube placed, as she loves to eat (particularly 
sweets and red wine). Janice requests that Brenda be allowed to eat and drink what she wants. She says the home 
caregiving team will try to minimize the risk of aspiration as best they can but that making Brenda forego oral food/
nutrition is not worth the impact on her quality of life. In other words, she thinks Brenda would prefer to take the risk 
of aspirating by eating foods she likes, even if this hastens her death. She asks that Brenda be allowed to resume oral 
feedings pending discharge home, and says she will follow up with home hospice. The physician in charge is reluctant to 
certify that Brenda is in a terminal condition to qualify for hospice. He asks for an ethics consultation to explore whether 
allowing Brenda to resume oral feedings while in the hospital or at home—foregoing the g-tube—might be considered a 
form of elder neglect. Brenda has no advance directive.
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when the concept of aspiration is 
raised? Historically, clinicians noted 
that people with dysphagia got chest 
infections and thus blamed the poor 
swallow. However, research has 
shown us that it is not whether one 
aspirates but what one aspirates 
that is the problem. People who fall 
into cold rivers and nearly drown 
have lungs full of water but do not 
necessarily go on to develop chest 
infections. How then might a little 
food and drink cause a problem, 
and how is it that people who are 
not taking oral food or drink still 
get chest infections? To be brief, the 
mouth is a dirty place with many 
microbes, some of which are not 
meant to be there. But the healthy 
person has defenses and a lower 
risk of chest infections. The primary 
defense is to keep the microbes 
under control, which requires manual 
brushing of the teeth and gums (or 
dentures, or just gums!), to have a 
working swallow mechanism, to eat 
and drink in a position that lessens the 
chance of material sneaking into the 
lungs, and to have a good infection-
fighting mechanism. Impairments 
in any of these cause problems. 
The factor most strongly associated 
with developing a chest infection is 
dependence on others for feeding 
(Langmore et al., 1998). Other 
factors include poor oral care (which 
no one wants to do), number of 
decayed teeth, tube feeding, comorbid 
conditions, multiple medications, and 
smoking—but not dysphagia.
To continue living, a person 
with AD will at some point need 
supplementation, which typically 
is tube feedings. A feeding tube is a 
medical intervention and so it (and 
feedings through it) can be withheld 
or withdrawn just like any other 
treatment. In reality, the emotional 
connections and symbolism of eating 
and of providing food and drink to 
those we love as an act of caring 
results in greater psychological 
discomfort when considering 
withdrawing this treatment, even 
among physicians (Christakis & 
Asch, 1993). Thus, the treatment 
may be continued in the absence of 
benefit, keeping people alive long 
after a natural death might have 
occurred, at times causing increased 
burden, or hastening death in some 
cases.
Evidence shows that feeding tube 
use in dementia does not ameliorate 
the problems historically presumed, 
such as poor nutritional status, skin 
breakdown, and slowed wound 
healing (Teno et al., 2012). There 
are downsides to tube feedings: 
increased risk of reflux from the tube 
feed, leading to aspiration of stomach 
contents, leading to pneumonitis 
(Marik, 2001). Infection at the 
feeding tube’s entry site is more 
likely to occur (Blomberg, Lagergren, 
Martin, Mattsson, & Lagergren, 
2012). Discomfort and associated 
behaviors such as pulling at the tube 
and resulting combative actions 
may result in the use of chemical or 
physical restraints. Thus, the potential 
use of a feeding tube requires careful 
consideration of the disease path, the 
costs, benefits, and possible harms. 
Appropriate professionals should 
be consulted, such as a speech-
language pathologist who can provide 
advice such as how to maintain oral 
health and minimize the risk of lung 
infections (e.g., positioning Brenda 
upright when she is eating and 
drinking, not feeding her when she 
is drowsy, letting her choose finger 
foods, and making nutritious AND 
palatable items easily available to her 
to graze on).  
Who is the Legal Decision Maker?
From the information we have, it 
sounds like Brenda and Janice did 
at least have “The Conversation” 
(see http://theconversationproject.
org/), but Brenda’s wishes were never 
formally documented, such as in an 
advance directive appointing Janice 
as Brenda’s health care agent (HCA). 
Maryland’s Health Care Decision’s 
Act (HCDA) recognizes the “patient’s 
spouse or domestic partner” as 
the authorized decision-maker for 
patients lacking decision-making 
capacity who have no appointed 
HCA or guardian and are considered 
to be in a terminal or end-stage 
condition. “Terminal” is defined 
as an “incurable condition caused 
by injury, disease, or illness which, 
to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, makes death imminent and 
from which, despite the application of 
life–sustaining procedures, there can 
be no recovery” (HG §§5-601(u)). 
“Imminent” is not defined. “End-
stage condition” is defined as “an 
advanced, progressive, irreversible 
condition caused by injury, disease, 
or illness that has caused severe and 
permanent deterioration indicated 
by incompetency and complete 
physical dependency, and for which, 
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to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, treatment of the irreversible 
condition would be medically 
ineffective” (HG §§5-601(j)). It’s 
unclear whether Brenda meets criteria 
for either. 
Since Brenda separated from Vince 
a decade ago but never divorced, 
it’s unclear whether Vince’s legal 
status as Brenda’s husband trumps 
Janice’s status as domestic partner, 
unless Vince is unwilling to serve 
as surrogate, or Brenda retains the 
cognitive capacity to appoint Janice 
as her HCA. That Brenda and Vince 
have remained friends may bode 
well for cooperative decision-making 
between Vince and Janice. Whether 
Vince has a legal claim in decision-
making is a secondary concern to 
whether Brenda, if she could tell us, 
would value or dismiss his input. 
Even when people are divorced they 
sometimes remain close and value 
each other’s advice.  As with other 
scenarios where the patient cannot 
speak for herself, we try to gather 
information from all sources to 
build a picture of what the person 
might have wanted. If uncertainty 
remains regarding Brenda’s wishes, 
her extended network of friends and 
family, and her primary care provider 
may also provide insight. 
Appropriate Hospice Referral or 
Elder Neglect?
Any person of sound mind can 
refuse medical interventions. This 
becomes more difficult when 
someone else is making a decision 
to refuse an intervention (e.g., tube 
feedings) and consent to a plan of 
care that prioritizes quality of life 
over life prolongation (e.g., hospice 
and pleasure feedings). If Brenda 
is considered to have a terminal 
or end-stage condition, then it is 
acceptable to withhold artificial 
nutrition/hydration. If she is not 
considered to be in either condition, 
then decision-making may require 
more discussion, particularly absent 
an advance directive. The physician 
raises the serious issue of elder 
neglect. The ethics consultant should 
acknowledge that the physician is 
thinking broadly about consequences, 
perhaps framing the lack of nutrition 
and possible increased pneumonia 
risk with oral feedings as the primary 
considerations. The physician may 
feel that allowing Brenda to forego 
tube feedings and to eat or drink 
by mouth represents a professional 
breach of ethics. Why? Until very 
recently the received wisdom was that 
physicians must maintain life. But 
equally we might consider whether an 
unwanted medical intervention with 
the possible negative consequences 
outlined above would be a form of 
physical (and psychological) abuse. 
The medical team should focus on 
what is the standard of care for this 
particular patient in her particular 
condition. 
Whether a patient is considered 
to be hospice eligible is a matter 
of professional judgment. The 
designation as “terminal” for 
hospice differs from the definition 
in the HCDA—generally, a patient 
should have a life expectancy of 
six months or less. Physicians who 
do not routinely certify patients for 
hospice may be unfamiliar with the 
criteria used to designate a patient as 
terminally ill. There is often a fear 
from physicians that: a) if they certify 
a patient for hospice care and the 
patient lives beyond six months, the 
clinician will be penalized, and/or b) 
the patient or family might perceive 
it as the medical team giving up on 
them. In most cases, a discussion 
with the hospice medical director or 
palliative care colleagues will clear 
up any ambiguity, and the earlier 
the better (American Academy of 
Hospice and Palliative Medicine, 
2017).  
Pleasure Feeding & Waivers 
Allowing Brenda to eat or drink 
by mouth for pleasure despite 
her swallowing impairments 
understandably makes some 
clinicians fearful of doing more harm 
than good. This issue often comes up 
in the long-term care environment, 
where patients or surrogates are 
sometimes asked to sign “waivers” 
(see Alternative Treatment Consents 
on page 12) releasing the facility 
from liability if they choose to engage 
in a behavior contrary to clinical 
recommendations. Is this ethically 
justified?
According to the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(2016), patients’ rights (and those 
of their health care decision-makers 
where decisional capacity is an 
issue) must be respected in their care 
plan—they can consent to and refuse 
treatment, without fear of retribution, 
coercion or cessation of general care. 
It’s stated:
“This provision addresses assisted 
nutrition and hydration, and, like 
all treatments, residents have the 
right to accept or refuse. Accepting 
a resident’s refusal, or deferring 
to their documented preferences, 
does not absolve a facility of its 
responsibilities to provide adequate 
nutrition or permit the facility not to 
meet a resident’s nutritional needs. 
It does recognize that a competent 
resident has the right to make 
choices about assisted nutrition 
and hydration and that there are 
circumstances where failure to 
maintain acceptable parameters of 
nutritional status are not a reflection 
of failure(s) of care” (Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
2016, p. 68849).
This means that if a patient chooses 
an approach different to that advised 
by the facility, even if the patient 
cannot maintain her nutritional 
status or has increased risk of lung 
infections from oral intake, then such 
outcomes will not be considered a 
fault of the facility (presuming the 
decision is informed and efforts are 
made to minimize risks).
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WAIVERS 
ALTERNATIVE TREATMENT 
CONSENTS 
Medicare and Medicaid regulations affirm an individual’s right to 
refuse medical recommendations, even if this exposes the individual 
to harm. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
provides guidance to health care facilities (such as nursing homes) 
regarding how to address such refusals. Facility administrators and 
staff may fear being blamed and sanctioned if patients or residents 
under their care choose to disregard medical advice and experience 
harm. One solution implemented by some facilities is to have the 
resident or surrogate sign a waiver document in which they absolve 
the facility from liability. This is not recommended. Instead, CMS 
encourages facilities to ensure that the following duties have been met 
when faced with refusal of medical recommendations (CMS, 2016): 
• Assess the resident’s decision-making capacity and involve 
the health care agent or legal representative if capacity is 
determined to be lacking; 
• Determine and document what the resident is refusing; 
• Assess the reasons for the refusal; 
• Advise the resident about the consequences of refusal; 
• Offer pertinent alternative treatments; and  
• Continue to provide all other appropriate services. 
Lawyers Kelly MacDonald and Michael Seale provide examples of 
“Alternative Treatment Consents,” which allow a facility to document 
their efforts to honor a patient’s or resident’s choice while meeting 
CMS’ regulations.  Their list of “Do’s and Don’ts When Developing 
Alternative Treatment Consents,” and examples, is available at https://
www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/Materials/Documents/
LTC15/ee_mcdonald_seale.pdf.  
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Crucial in this situation is that 
the dialogue of discussion has 
been carefully documented. That 
is, a clear record should be kept of 
all discussions documenting the 
information given to Vince and 
Janice and their responses, including 
verbatim quotes to demonstrate 
their understanding. This is what the 
courts will require if a case is ever 
brought forth. Any signed “waiver” 
document without the aforementioned 
documentation of discussions is at 
best useless in the eyes of a court, and 
at worst, may be considered a form 
of coercion—which is also clearly 
addressed in the Federal Register 
document (Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services, 2016). 
What Should be Done?
Discussions about end-of-life 
preferences, including decisions 
about feeding tubes, should happen 
more routinely for all people, but 
particularly for persons with AD 
(and much earlier in the disease 
process). These discussions need 
to be documented in the form of 
HCA appointments, living wills, and 
summaries in the medical record. 
Absent that, the best the team can do 
in this case is to identify the stage of 
Brenda’s disease (i.e., whether she is 
considered “terminal” and hospice-
eligible), clarify her wishes, reflect 
these in appropriate discharge orders 
on the Maryland Medical Orders for 
Life-Sustaining Treatment (MOLST) 
form, and if appropriate, work with 
hospice to arrange for home support.
Paula Leslie, PhD, FRCSLT (UK), 
CCC-SLP (USA)
Program Director: Doctor of Clinical 
Science (CScD)
Professor, Communication Science 
and Disorders
Specialist Advisor (Swallowing 
Disorders) RCSLT
University of Pittsburgh
Case Presentation 
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COMMENTS FROM 
A HOSPITAL ETHICS 
CONSULTANT
When one receives an Ethics 
Consultation, the question originally 
asked may or may not fully capture 
the matter at hand. Brenda's physician 
has asked whether forgoing the 
g-tube might be considered a form 
of elder neglect. The Centers for 
Disease Control defines neglect 
as: “failure by a caregiver or other 
responsible person to protect an 
elder from harm, or the failure to 
meet needs for essential medical 
care, nutrition, hydration, hygiene, 
clothing, basic activities of daily 
living or shelter, which results in a 
serious risk of compromised health 
and safety” (https://www.cdc.gov/
violenceprevention/elderabuse/
definitions.html).
When examining whether or not 
placing a feeding tube may be a form 
of elder neglect, one must examine 
first whether its placement would 
be clinically and ethically justified. 
Feeding tubes are used to provide or 
supplement nutrition when a patient 
is incapable of taking (sufficient) food 
orally, like Brenda. Although they 
may be used to minimize aspiration 
of stomach contents, this may still 
occur with tube feedings. They may 
be contraindicated in the face of 
terminal illness, when a patient is 
physiologically unable to tolerate 
the placement of the tube, when the 
patient would be unable to assimilate 
the nutrition provided by it, or when 
the patient is unable to tolerate 
the tube itself and intentionally or 
unintentionally pulls it out. 
Before addressing the question 
of neglect, Brenda's decision maker 
and her physician have to decide 
whether the placement of a feeding 
tube is ethically justified. Brenda did 
not complete an advance directive, 
so there is no clear evidence of her 
wishes about tube feedings. There is 
also no evidence that placing her on 
tube feedings will prolong her life or 
improve her quality of life. Brenda 
is still able to take food by mouth, 
although it may not be sufficient to 
sustain her. There is evidence she 
is aspirating and she has now been 
hospitalized twice for aspiration. 
Even if steps are taken to minimize 
the chance of aspiration, it is likely 
that she will continue to aspirate. 
Janice notes that Brenda would 
not want a feeding tube because 
she continues to enjoy eating and 
drinking. Janice believes Brenda’s 
quality of life will be significantly 
diminished if she is unable to eat 
or drink. Even if it was decided 
that a feeding tube would provide 
needed nutrition/hydration, it seems 
unnecessary to restrict Brenda from 
taking food and drink she enjoys. 
There is a risk of aspiration present 
in both circumstances. Further, 
withholding things that enhance her 
quality of life, given her presumed 
inability to understand the risk they 
pose for her, could be seen as harmful 
to Brenda, as she may not understand 
why she is not allowed or offered 
food and drink. Though continuing 
to eat and drink may constitute a 
safety risk for Brenda, her legal 
decision maker can discern that this 
risk is acceptable given the benefit it 
provides. The physician and team are 
responsible for educating the decision 
maker and caregivers on the risks 
and ways of minimizing the risks to 
Brenda, with or without the feeding 
tube. 
With regard to the question of 
neglect, this requires not providing 
for a basic need. What one needs is 
dependent on circumstance. Brenda 
suffers from a chronic, progressive, 
long term illness that will bring about 
her death, possibly within the next 
six to twelve months. What care is 
appropriate for her is discerned by 
her physician and legal decision 
maker in light of her “big picture.” 
As the burden of the feeding tube 
may outweigh its benefits, one can 
argue that for Brenda, the tube may 
not be appropriate. Though neglect 
does not require intention, it is clear 
here that if the feeding tube is not 
placed, the intention is not to hasten 
or cause Brenda’s death, but rather, 
to avoid the physiologic and possible 
emotional burdens that providing tube 
feedings may cause. 
Brenda’s physician is “reluctant” 
to certify that Brenda is in a terminal 
condition to qualify for hospice. This 
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is not uncommon. Physicians often 
hesitate to make this determination 
for a multitude of reasons.  Ethics 
consultants can ask the “surprise” 
question: “Would you be surprised if 
your patient were to die in the next 
6 months?” This, coupled with the 
explicit criteria provided by CMS 
for Hospice admission for patients 
with dementia, can be useful to 
physicians in making this assessment. 
It is not the case, however, that a 
patient must meet the criteria for 
Hospice eligibility to decline life 
sustaining treatment. If it were, then 
there would be no place for informed 
consent and surrogate decision 
makers, as CMS would take on the 
role of surrogate and prolong all life 
sustaining treatment until Hospice 
eligibility. Even if Brenda does not 
have a prognosis that currently meets 
Hospice eligibility criteria, the extent 
to which life sustaining treatment 
is going to be pursued is important 
to explore. Regardless of whether 
or not a feeding tube is placed, 
conversation must be had about under 
what conditions Brenda will return 
to the hospital. If she aspirates and 
gets aspiration pneumonia or suffers 
other complications, what treatments 
are appropriate for Brenda? It may be 
decided that treatment with antibiotics 
would be acceptable if they provide 
more good than harm, but that the 
harms of intubation for (pending) 
respiratory failure would outweigh 
any good, justifying withholding 
intubation and mechanical 
ventilation. Whether treatment 
refusals by a surrogate are considered 
appropriate or inappropriate requires 
consideration of Brenda’s prognosis, 
known preferences, and the medical 
standard of care.
Under Maryland law, if Brenda is 
considered “terminal” as defined in 
the Health Care Decisions Act, her 
spouse or domestic partner would 
be her legal decision-maker.  The 
legislature did not anticipate that 
someone would have both at the 
same time so legally it might be 
an issue as to who can speak for 
Brenda. Regardless of who fills this 
role legally, her surrogate should 
make decisions using substituted 
judgment, deciding as Brenda 
would, taking into consideration 
her current illness, her values, her 
quality of life, and the benefits and 
burdens a particular treatment would 
provide. It may be prudent to engage 
both Vince and Janice in Brenda’s 
decision making. Even if Vince is the 
legally authorized decision maker, 
it is likely that Brenda would trust 
Janice to speak on her behalf, given 
their relationship. Even if we do 
not know that Brenda would have 
chosen Janice as her health care 
agent, if Vince believes that she 
would have valued speaking with 
Janice about this decision, she (and 
anyone else she would have engaged) 
should be included in Vince's 
discernment. Vince may choose not 
to act as Brenda’s surrogate decision 
maker, given Brenda and Janice's 
relationship, even though he remains 
legally married to Brenda. If Vince 
remains as decision maker, and he 
and Janice disagree on Brenda’s 
plan of care, the Ethics Consultant 
could assist in an exploration of 
Brenda’s values, what now enhances 
her quality of life, and whether a 
feeding tube (or other life-prolonging 
interventions) would benefit her.  
The consultant could also assist in 
identifying any gaps in understanding 
the benefits and burdens of a feeding 
tube, the locus of any disagreement 
between Vince and Janice, and assist 
in ensuring that Brenda remains the 
focus of the decision at hand. If the 
disagreement remains, Janice could 
petition the court for guardianship of 
Brenda, but this is a lengthy process 
and a decision would likely have 
to be made on a more expedient 
timeline. While Brenda is certainly 
a vulnerable person deserving of 
care and protection, it seems from 
the case that she is surrounded by 
persons who have her best interests in 
mind. In fact, she is likely receiving 
more direct caregiver interaction than 
she would in a nursing home, and 
much of the care is being provided 
by her friends, those who knew her 
before her cognitive and physical 
decline. This bodes well for patient-
centered decision-making that yields 
compassionate, positive outcomes. 
Birgitta N. Sujdak Mackiewicz, Ph.D.
Director of Ethics
OSF Saint Francis Medical Center & 
Children's Hospital of Illinois
Peoria, IL
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MARCH 
2-4 Conflict Resolution and Clinical-Setting Mediation for 
Healthcare, sponsored by the Center for Conflict Resolution in 
Healthcare LLC, Memphis, TN. Visit: http://www.healthcare-
mediation.net/trainings.html.
22 (1-2PM) The Choice to Become a Research Subject: A First 
Person Perspective, Webinar Discussion led by Rebecca Dresser, 
JD, Washington University in St. Louis, available at msubioethics.
clickwebinar.com/brownbag. Visit: http://www.bioethics.msu.edu/
brownbag-webinar/2016-2017-series.
23-24  Fourth National Nursing Ethics Conference, Los Angeles, 
CA. Visit: http://ethicsofcaring.org/registration/. 
24-25 Clinical Ethics Bootcamp, sponsored by Children's 
Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN. Contact: Nneka.Sederstrom@
ChildrensMN.Org.
24-26  Re-enchanting Medicine: Conference on Medicine and 
Religion, JW Marriott Galleria, Houston, TX. Visit: http://www.
medicineandreligion.com/. 
27 (1-2PM)  Webinar with James Mumford, PhD: Reproduction 
in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction, sponsored by Children’s 
Mercy Bioethics Center. Visit: https://cmhbioethics.webex.com/. 
APRIL
3 (1-2PM)  Webinar with Larry Churchill, PhD, “What would you 
do if this were your child, Doc?” sponsored by Children’s Mercy 
Bioethics Center. Visit: https://cmhbioethics.webex.com/. 
6  Action for Health Equity, sponsored by the University of 
Maryland Schools of Medicine and Public Health, Adele H. Stamp 
Student Union, University of Maryland College Park.
7-8  Second Annual Conference on Reproductive Ethics: New Ideas 
and Innovations, Sponsored by Alden March Bioethics Institute, 
Albany Medical College, Albany, NY. Visit: http://www.amc.edu/
academic/bioethics/reproductiveethicsconference.cfm.
16 (1-2PM) Social Determinants of Behavioral Health, Webinar 
Discussion led by C. Debra Furr-Holden, PhD, Michigan State 
University, available at msubioethics.clickwebinar.com/brownbag. 
Visit: http://www.bioethics.msu.edu/brownbag-webinar/2016-2017-
series.
18-21 Intensive Bioethics Course, sponsored by Houston Methodist 
Hospital and The Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy at 
Baylor College of Medicine, Houston Methodist Research Institute, 
Houston, TX. Visit: http://events.houstonmethodist.org/bioethics. 
MAY
25-28 Workshop in Clinical Ethics Mediation, sponsored by the 
Program in Clinical Conflict Management at the University of 
Pennsylvania. Visit: http://medicalethics.med.upenn.edu/education/
master-of-bioethics-mbe/clinical-ethics-mediation. 
RECURRING EVENTSCALENDAR OF EVENTS
Ethics for Lunch Seminars, sponsored by the 
Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics and 
Ethics Committee, Sheik Zayed Tower Chevy 
Chase Conference Center (1800 Orleans St.) 
Baltimore, MD. 12N-1:15PM. Visit: http://www.
bioethicsinstitute.org/efl 
March 21 
April 18 
May 16
Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics 
Seminar Series, either at Sheik Zayed Tower 
Chevy Chase Conference Center (1800 Orleans 
St.) or Feinstone Hall, E2030, Bloomberg 
School of Public Health (615 N. Wolfe St.) 
Baltimore, MD. 12N-1:15PM. Visit: http://
www.bioethicsinstitute.org/education-training-2/
seminar-series
March 12 - Speaker: Lisa Lehmann, MD, PhD, 
MSc, Executive Director of the National Center 
for Ethics in Health Care
March 27 - Speaker: Ruha Benjamin, MA, 
PhD, Informed Refusal: Towards a Justice-based 
Bioethics
April 10 - Speaker: Chris Feudtner, MD PhD, 
MPH, Steven D. Handler Endowed Chair of 
Medical Ethics; Director, Department of Medical 
Ethics, The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia
April 24 - Speaker: Dale Jamieson, MA, 
PhD, Professor of Environmental Studies & 
Philosophy, NYU School of Law
May 8 - Speaker: Joseph Fins, MD, E. William 
Davis, Jr. M.D. Professor of Medical Ethics, 
Weill Cornell Medical College
Ethics Lunch Rounds (lunch & CME provided), 
Sponsored by the University of Maryland 
Medical Center Ethics Committee, 22 S. 
Greene St., Borges Conference Room (N2E30). 
12N-1PM. For more information, contact: 
hsilverm@medicine.umaryland.edu
March 24 
April 21 
May 12
The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a membership organization, established by the Law and 
Health Care Program at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is to facilitate 
and enhance ethical reflection in all aspects of decision making in health care settings by supporting and providing informational 
and educational resources to ethics committees serving health care institutions in the state of Maryland. The Network attempts to 
achieve this goal by:
• Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate ethical dilemmas within their institution and as they strive to 
assist their institution act consistently with its mission statement;
• Fostering communication and information sharing among Network members;
• Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other healthcare providers, and members of the general 
public on ethical issues in health care; and
• Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees and ultimately the care of patients in Maryland.
MHECN appreciates the support of its individual and institutional members. MHECN also welcomes support from affiliate 
members who provide additional financial support.
The Law & Health Care Program
Maryland Health Care Ethics 
Committee Network
University of Maryland  
Francis King Carey School of Law
500 W. Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM
THE MID-ATLANTIC ETHICS COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER
NAME
ORGANIZATION
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE, ZIP
TELEPHONE/FAX NOS.
E-MAIL
No. of Subscriptions Requested:
     Individual Subscriptions     Institutional (MHECN    
     @ $35/yr.        non-member) Subscriptions 
         @ $90/yr.  (up to 20 copies)
Please make checks payable to:  The University of Maryland
and mail to: The University of Maryland School of Law
  Law & Health Care Program - MHECN
  500 West Baltimore Street
  Baltimore, MD  21201
For information on MHECN membership rates, contact us at 
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or (410) 706-4457 or visit http://www.law.umaryland.edu/mhecn
All correspondence  
including articles, cases, 
events, letters should 
be sent to:
Diane E. Hoffmann 
Editor
The Mid-Atlantic Ethics  
Committee Newsletter
University of Maryland
Francis King Carey 
School of Law
L&HCP
500 W. Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
E-mail:  dhoffmann@
law.umaryland.edu
